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Of Dolphins and Homnones
By john H.]ackson
INTRODUCTION
Proposition 1: Protection of the environment has become exceedingly important and
promises to be more important for the benefit of future generations. An important part
of protecting the environment involves rules of international cooperation and/or
sanction so that some government actions to enhance environmental protection will
not be undermined by actions of other governments. Sometimes such rules involve
trade restricting measures.

T

his article includes selected
portions extracted from a manu-

script prepared for presentation at
the annual law and policy conference at
Washington & Lee University in
September 1992, devoted this year to
international trade rules and environmental policies. The full annotated
manuscript appears in 49 Washington

Proposition 2: Trade liberalization is important for enhancing world economic
welfare and providing greater opportunity for satisfying lives for billions of individuals. Any measure which restricts trade often will decrease the achievement of this goal.

& Lee Uiw Review 1227 (1992).

These two propositions state the opposing policy objectives which currently pose
important and difficult dilemmas for governments. This type of "policy discord" is not
unique, there are many similar policy discords, on both the national and the international scene, which governments must confront. Indeed, with respect to environmental
policy and its relation to trade policy, there is at least some evidence that they are
complementary, in the sense that increasing world welfare can lead to citizen demands
and governmental actions to improve protection for the environment. The poorest in
the world cannot afford such protection; but when welfare increases, this protection
can be more affordable.
An unfortunate development in public and interest group attention to trade and
environment is the appearance of hostility between proponents of the different
propositions stated above. The hostility is misplaced, because each group, for its
respective policy objectives, will need the assistance and cooperation of the other. Of
course some of this tension is typical of political systems. Often political participants
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... much more difficult
to manage.

seek to achieve opposing objectives and goals. Each side may endorse legitimate
goals, but when the goals clash accommodation is necessary.
To some extent, the conflicts derive from a certain "difference in cultures"
between the trade policy experts and the environmental policy experts. Oddly enough,
even when operating within the framework of the same society, these different "policy
cultures" have developed different attitudes and perceptions of the political and policy
processes that create misunderstandings and conflict between them.
These problems are part of a broader trend of international
economic relations which is posing a number of perplexing and
troublesome situations for statesmen and policy leaders. Part of
this is inevitable in the light of growing international economic
interdependence. Such interdependence brings many benefits
from increased trade in both products and services across
national borders, resulting in efficiencies and economies of scale
which can raise world welfare (but not necessarily everyone's
welfare, since some groups will be required to adjust in the face
of such increased competition). These trends require a different
sort of attitude towards government regulation. Within a nation,
such government regulation as consumer protection, competition
policy, prudential measures (of banking and financial institutions), measures protecting health and welfare (e.g., alcohol and
abortion control), and human rights (e.g. prohibiting discrimination), are all designed by governments to promote worthy
policies which sometimes clash with market-oriented economic
policies. When economic interdependence moves a number of
these issues to the international scene, they become (at least in
today's defective inteRJ.ational system) much more difficult to manage. The circumstances and the broader context of the international system create in many contexts
(not just those concerning environmental policies) a series of problems and questions,
including:
• General questions of effectiveness of national "sovereignty" in the face of a need to
cooperate with other countries.
• Perplexing questions of how new international rules should be made, questions that
often involve voting procedures.
• General questions of the appropriateness and degree to which national sovereignty
will submit to international dispute settlement procedures to resolve differences.
• Problems of a single national sovereign using extraterritorial reach of its regulation
(sometimes termed "unilateralism").
• Significant legitimate differences of view between nations as to economic structure,
level of economic development, different forms of government, different views of
the appropriate role of government in economic activities, etc. Developing countries
for example, will have different views from those of rich countries on many "tradeoff' matters, arguing that environmental regulations can unfairly restrain their
economic development. They note that rich countries have benefited from decades
or centuries of freedom from environmental protection rules and even today are
responsible for most of the world's pollution. To impose such rules on poor
countries threatens starvation and stagnation for the populations there, so it is
argued.
All these circumstances and arguments occur in the context of a relatively
chaotic and unstructured international system.
In this paper, it is my intention to probe the more specific issues of the relationship of international trade policy rules to environmental policies and rules, primarily in
the context of GATT (which is the most important set of international trade policy
rules).
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When speaking of "environmental" policies this paper will use that term very
broadly. It would include, for example, measures relating to health or health risks.
The phrases "trade policies" or "trade liberalization" also are used broadly to relate
not only to trade in goods, but also trade in services.

I. 0RJECTIVES OF TRADE RULES AND THEIR
RELATION TO ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY
The most significant and widespread rule system for international
trade is the GATT system (which includes the GATT and over 200 ancillary
treaties plus a number of other related arrangements, decisions, etc.). The
GATT may soon be modified by the Uruguay Round, so this paper will refer
to the GATT/MTO system to broadly embrace the system as it is now and
may emerge within a year or two. Of course, a number of other treaties or
arrangements, such as regional blocs like the proposed NAFfA-North
American Free Trade Accord- are relevant to this discussion of "tradeenvironment policy discord," but most of the essential principles of that
discord can be discussed in the context of GATT.
The basic policy underlying the GATT (and the broader "Bretton
Woods System" established in 1944-48) is well known. The objective is to
liberalize trade which crosses national boundaries and to pursue the benefits
described in economic theory as "comparative advantage," which relates
partly to the tbeories of the economies of scale. When nations specialize,
they become more efficient in producing a product (and possibly .also a
service), and thus if they can trade for their other needs, they and the world
will be better off. The international rules are designed to restrain governmental interference with that trade.
These policies recognize certain exceptions, including the problem of
"externalities," which is an important part of the problem of environmental protection.
If a producer pollutes a stream in his manufacturing process and there are no laws
against that, he has imposed an "externality cost" on the world which is not recouped
from him or the consumers of his product. This appears to be one of the most important core dilemmas or policy problems of the relationship of trade and environmental
policies. Thus, much of this relationship is concerned with how environmental
protection costs can be "internalized," to follow what is sometimes termed the
"polluter pays principle."
To illustrate, a few "hypothetical" cases will demonstrate some of the possible
policy clashes. In the cases below I use the initials "ENV" to indicate the environmentally "correct" country which imports (or exports), and the initials "EXP" to
indicate the exporting country.
-ENV establishes a rule that requires a special deposit or tax on packaging
which is not biodegradable, arguing that such packages are a danger for the environment. It so happens that ENV producers use a different package which is not so
taxed. Only the packages from EXP are affected. (In some cases it can be established
that the tax imposed is in excess of that needed for the environmental protection.)
-ENV establishes a border tax (countervailing duty) on any product of electronics which is imported from a country that does not have an environmental rule
required by ENV, arguing that the lack of such rule is in effect a "subsidy" when
measured by economic principles of internalization and "polluter pays," and that the
subsidy should be offset by a countervailing duty. EXP argues that its own method of
pollution control is different but fully adequate and more efficient and therefore
cheaper, so its products should not incur the clean-up duty. Or EXP argues that its
environment can better withstand pollution activity.
- ENV prohibits the importation of tropical hardwoods, on the grounds that
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imports of tropical hardwood products tend to induce deforestation in important
tropical forest areas, and such deforestation damages the world environment. ENV is
a temperate zone nation with temperate forests, but does not apply any rule against
temperate forest products, domestic or imported.

II.

NATIONAL TREATMENT AND

PRODUCf STANDARDS
One of the core principles of the GATT/MTO
system of trade liberalization is the rule known as
"national treatment," found in GATT Article III. The
national treatment clause can be traced far back into
treaties of centuries ago, and is applied to a number of
different governmental activities. It obligates governments to treat foreign products or persons the same as it
treats its domestic products or persons, for purposes of
a variety of governmental actions.
One example for trade would be a regulation
which imposed a higher tax on automobiles with
greater horse power and speed, when the importing country knew that its own automobile production tended to concentrate heavily in automobiles with less horse power
and speed. Thus, there are some delicate decisions that have to be made in interpreting the GATT Article III.
These issues ari~e in a number of "environmental" type cases. The key issue
then is who should decide whether the regulation is appropriate? Even if a regulation
is bothfacially non-discriminatory and also de facto non-discriminatory, some
important issues about a "minimum standard" arise. A current significant case
between the U.S. and the European Community raises this issue, namely the Beef
Hormone Case. The EC prohibits the sale of beef which has been grown with the
assistance of artificial hormone infusions. The U.S. argues that it applies hormones by
a method which is totally safe for human ingestion and that the EC has no scientific
basis for its regulation, which incidentally happens to hurt U.S. exports to the EC
of beef products. The EC replies that it has no obligation to provide a scientific
justification.
This dispute has festered on. The U.S. pointed to a clause in the Tokyo Round
Standards Code, which might have given some opportunity to require scientific
justification for a product regulation. However, negotiators in the Uruguay Round
have developed a draft phyto-sanitary text designed to provide some minimum
standards for government regulation requiring "scientific principles" as justification.
This draft text has raised some serious concerns on the part of environmental policy
experts in the U.S. and elsewhere, who worry that this text would inhibit national
governments (or sub-federal governmental units) from determining the appropriateness of a regulation that went beyond some minimum international standard. The
language itself does not seem to call for this, but the implication that there will be an
opportunity for exporting countries to challenge regulations of importing countries and
to require the importing country to justify the regulation on the basis of "sound
science," raises substantial fears that GATT panels will tend to rule against regulations
that go beyond a lowest common denominator of national environmental regulations
in the GATT/MTN system. This pushes the discourse into the question of institutions
(which will be discussed below).
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III.

GENERAL EXCEPTIONS IN ARTICLE XX:

HEALTH & CONSERVATION
GATT contains an Article XX entitled "General Exceptions," which includes
important provisions that override other obligations of GATT in certain circumstances
defined in the Article. Again it is not practical or appropriate in this
paper to deal with all of Article XX, but there are certain key measures
which we can address. Quite often, concern for environmental matters
focuses on paragraphs (b) and (g) of Article XX:
(b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health . ..
(g) relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources, if
such measures are made effective in conjunction with restrictions
on domestic production or consumption . ..
The opening paragraph of Article XX, however, imposes some
important qualifications on the exceptions of Article XX. To a large
degree, these provisions provide a softened measure of "national
treatment," and "MFN" obligations. They require governments which
take measures which arguably qualify for the exceptions of Article XX
to do so in such a way as to minimize the impacts mentioned in the
opening paragraph. This has led some panel reports to interpret Article
XX so as to require nations to use the "least restrictive alternative"
reasonably available to it as measures designed to support the goals of
the exceptions of Article XX.
There are a number of important interpretive problems with respect
to Article XX, and some of these are key to the environment-trade .•
liberalization clash. Two interpretive questions in particular stand out,
namely the interpretation of the word "necessary," and the question of
whose health, or which exhaustible natural resources can be the object
of an acceptable national government regulation.
With respect to "necessary," clearly this word is one which needs interpretive
attention. It is partly interpreted by the "least restrictive alternative" jurisprudence
mentioned above. Thus, if there are two or more alternatives which a government
could use to protect human life or health, it is not "necessary" to choose the one which
has more restrictions on trade, when an alternative that is equally efficient to protect
human life or health exists. This will obviously impose some restraint on the latitude
that nations, or sub-federal governments have to impose regulations for environmental
purposes. On the other hand, it is considered important to prevent Article XX from
becoming a large loophole which governments could use to justify almost any
measures that were motivated by protectionist considerations. It is this slippery slope
problem that worries many in connection with Article XX. The problem arises in a
number of cases, including that of packaging, or hardwood imports, outlined above.
The other interpretive problem is conceptually more difficult. When GATT
Article XX provides an exception for measures necessary to protect human, animal or
plant life or health, should it be interpreted to mean life or health of humans, etc., only
within the importing country, or anywhere in the world? This interpretive problem is
intimately related to the subject taken up in the next section below, concerning the
process/product characteristic difficulty. So far as this author can determine, Article
XX has not been interpreted to allow a government to impose regulations necessary to
protect life or health of humans, animals, or plants existing outside its own territorial
borders. This was a problem addressed (somewhat ambiguously) in the Tuna Dolphin
Case (again discussed below). The problem is the typical slippery slope danger,

Even if a regulation is
both facially non-discriminatory and also defacto
non-discriminatory, some
important issues about a
"minimum standard" arise.

39

combined with the worry that powerful (and wealthy) countries will impose their own
views regarding environmental (or other social or welfare) standards on other parts of
the world where such views may not be entirely appropriate. (The term "eco-imperialism" has been coined for this problem.)
If an importing nation can prohibit goods from a poor third world country in
which the production occurs in a manner that is moderately dangerous to humans, why
also could not a nation prohibit the importation of goods produced in an environment
that differs in many social or cultural attributes from its own society?
Why, it is asked, should one country be able to use its trade laws to
depart from the general liberal trade rules of the GATT/MTO system, to
enforce its own view of how plant or animal life in the oceans (beyond
territorial sea, or other jurisdictional limits) should be protected or to
protect the ozone layer (as suggested in the tropical hardwoods hypothetical case)?
Other countries may have a somewhat different view of the
trade-off between economic and welfare values of production and
human life or health. Even in the industrial countries, there is tolerance
of certain kinds of economic activity which almost inevitably will result
in human deaths or injury (such as major construction projects for dams
or bridges, etc.). These are tough issues, and ones that will require
a lot of close and careful attention, presumably in the context not only of
new rule making (or treaty drafting), but also in the processes of interpretation through the dispute settlement mechanisms. Thus once again,
institutional questions become significant (as discussed in Part VII).

IV.

THE PROCESS-PRODUCT PROBLEM: THE

TUNA DOLPHIN CASE

& THE

GLOBAL

COMMONS QUESTIONS
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An important conceptual "difficulty" of GATT is the so-called
process-product characteristic problem, which relates closely to the
Article XX exceptions and also to the national treatment obligations and
other provisions of GATT. This issue is central to the so-called Tuna
Dolphin Case and needs to be explained.
Suppose an importing country wishes to prohibit the sale of
domestic or imported automobiles which emit pollutants in their exhaust
at a rate above the specified standard. Subject to our discussion above in
Part II, there seems to be little difficulty about this regulation. It relates to the characteristics of the product itself. If the product itself is polluting, then on a non-discriminatory basis the government may prohibit its sale (or also prohibit its importation, as a
measure to prohibit its sale).
Suppose on the other hand, the government feels that an automobile plant in a
foreign country is operated in such a way as to pose substantial hazards to human
health, either through danger of accidents from the machinery, pollutants or unduly
high temperatures in the factory. On an apparently nondiscriminatory basis, the
government may wish to impose a prohibition on the sale of domestic or imported
automobiles which are produced in factories with certain characteristics. However, in
this case it should be noted that the imported automobiles themselves are perfectly
appropriate and do not have dangerous or polluting characteristics. Thus, the target of
the importing country's regulation is the "process" of producing the product. The key
question under the GATT/MTO system is whether the importing country is justified
under either national treatment rules of nondiscrimination or exceptions of Article XX

(which do not require strict nondiscrimination in national treatment as we discussed
above). The worry of trade policy experts is that to allow the process characteristic to
be the basis for trade-restrictive measures would be to open an enormous loophole,
permitting a swath to be cut through GATT.
Obviously, the Tuna-Dolphin Case relates to these issues. Although the GATT
panel report is not entirely clear on this matter, it seems fair to say
that there were two important objections to the U.S. embargo on the
importation of tuna because of the U.S. objection to the way the
tuna were fished (causing danger to dolphins). First, there is the
question of "eco-imperialism," where one nation unilaterally
imposes its fishing standards (albeit for environmental purposes) on
other nations in the world without their consent or participation in
the development of the standard. Secondly, there is the problem of
the inconsistency of the import embargo with the GATT rules
unless there is some GATT exception that would permit the
embargo, and of course that exception relates to the "processproduct" interpretation problem and therefore also to that problem
in the national treatment rule and the general exceptions of GATT
(Articles III and XX).
The approach in the GATT system so far has given great
weight to this slippery slope concern, and thus tilted towards
interpreting both the Article III (including some Article XI questions) and the Article XX exceptions to apply to the product
standards and to life and health within the importing country, but
not to extend these concepts and exceptions to "processes" outside
the territorial limits of jurisdiction. The alternative which threatens
to create the great loophole is a serious worry. The theories of
comparative advantage which drive the policy of liberal trade
suggest that an important reason for trade is differences among
nations. These can be differences of natural resources, but also of
cultural and population characteristics such as education, training, investment, and
environment. To allow an exception to GATTwhich permits some governments to
unilaterally impose standards on production processes as a condition of importation
would substantially undermine the policy objectives of trade liberalization.
On the other hand, trade sanctions (which include embargoes) are a very
attractive and potentially useful means of providing enforcement of cooperatively
developed international standards, including environmental standards.
Thus, there is an important trade-off which the GATT must face. It is not
adequate, in this writer's view, for the GATT simply to say that trade should never be
used as a sanction for environmental (or human rights or anti-prison labor) purposes.
There are already a number of situations in which the GATT has at least tolerated (if
not explicitly accepted) trade-sanction activity for what is perceived to be valid
overriding international objectives. What are the implications of this problem? To
this writer, it seems clear that specific and significant attention must be addressed by
the GATT/MTO system to provide for exceptions for environmental purposes, in a
way that will establish boundaries to these exceptions to prevent them from being used
as excuses for a variety of protectionist devices or unilateral social welfare concerns.
Possibly these should be limited to the situation where governments are protecting
matters that occur within their territorial jurisdiction.
It may be feasible to develop an explicit exception in the GATT/MTO system
(possibly by the waiver process which is reasonably efficient) for a certain list of
specified broad-based multilateral treaties. One of the concerns expressed about the
Tuna Dolphin Case in GATT is the implications that it might have for the so-called
"Montreal Protocol" concerning CFC's (Chlorofluorocarbons) and the danger to the
earth's ozone layer. The Montreal Protocol provides a potential future authorization of
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trade sanction measures against even non-signatories for processes (not product
characteristics) which violate the norms of the treaty. Under the current rules of
GATT, if they are interpreted to exclude exceptions for the process situation, the
Montreal Protocol Measures would be contrary to GATT obligations, except as among
the signatories to the Montreal Protocol.
It may take some time and study to develop the precise wording of an appropriate amendment or treaty exception for the GATT/MTO system for these environmental treaty cases, but in the short run for a limited period
of years, it could be efficient to use a GATT waiver to
clarify the issue as to specifically named treaties.
In all likelihood, there are sufficient signatories to
the Montreal Protocol who are also GATT members to
rather easily adopt a GATT waiver (two-thirds of the
GATT Contracting Parties) to authorize the trade
measures contemplated in the Montreal Protocol. But at
the same time, it might be wise to go a few steps further
and include in such a waiver several other specified
treaties. Obviously, the waiver can also be amended in
the future to add more specifically named treaties.
Even under such a waiver approach, there are still
some important policy and treaty drafting questions that
must be faced. For example, should the exception to
GATT be worded to apply only to the mandatory trade
measures required by the specified environmental
treaties? Or should they also be extended to those
measures which are deemed discretionary but "authorized" by the envirqpmental treaties? Or, would the GATT waiver even go the further
step to authorize GATT members to take trade measures unilaterally to help enforce
the substantive environmental norms contained in the environmental treaties, even
when such environmental treaties do not have trade measures/sanctions indicated in
their texts?

V.

SUBSIDIES

The problem of subsidies in international trade policy is perhaps the single most
perplexing issue of the current world trading system, and one that is very complex
indeed. Some of the major controversies and negotiation impasses (such as the
question of agriculture) relate to this problem. The GATT rules have become increasingly elaborate, and contain several different dimensions. Not only are there provisions in GATT itself (Articles VI and XVI), but there is the Tokyo Round "Code" on
subsidies and countervailing duties which provides obligations to the signatories of
that code. It is not feasible in this paper to go into great detail on the subsidies
question. Indeed, the subsidies question in relation to environmental policies may
be one of the most intricate and difficult of those facing the world trading system
during the next decade.
. The following hypothetical cases can illustrate some of the problems that
could occur:
• Suppose an exporting country establishes a subsidy for certain of its manufacturing
companies to allow them grants or tax privileges to assist them in establishing
environmental enhancement measures (such as machinery to clean up smoke or
water emissions, or other capital goods for environmental or safety/health purposes).
When those producers export their goods, the goods could be vulnerable to foreign
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nations imposing countervailing duties. Is this appropriate or should a special
exception for environmental measures be carved out?
• Can an importing country argue that the lack of environmental rules
in the exporting country is the equivalent of a subsidy and impose a
countervailing duty?
• Similarly, suppose a nation lacks environmental rules with the result
that its domestic producers can produce more cheaply and thus compete
to keep out goods which are imported from other countries which have
substantial environmental rules. Thus the lack of environmental rules
becomes an effective protectionist device.
Obviously these hypotheticals are not so hypothetical. A good part
of the discourse about the proposed NAFfA treaty expresses the worry
that if Mexico lacks environmental rules, this will give Mexico a competitive advantage vis-a-vis American (or Canadian) producers.
These problems illustrate the need for careful examination of the
subsidy rules so as to design appropriate environmental exceptions or
rules without destroying the advantages of the subsidy rules.

VI. THE INSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS:
DISPUTE SETTLEMENT, TRANSPARENCY,
AND JURISPRUDENCE
The GATT is a rather strange and troubled institution. It was born
with several birth defects, since it was never intended to be an organization itself. Instead it was intended that an ITO Charter (International
Trade Organization) would come into effect that would provide the
institutional framework, in which GATT would be one part. Because of
this troubled birth history, GATT has always been deficient in the
institutional clauses normally found in a treaty establishing an international organization.
These problems have become increasingly troublesome as world economic
developments have gone beyond the rules provided by the GATT system. Some of
these problems are being addressed in the current Uruguay Round GATT negotiation,
and, if that is ultimately successful, it may help improve the institutional situation.
Other GATT problems include problems of accepting new members, particularly those
with different economic structures; the problem of assisting developing countries; and
the difficulty of facing up to some of the more newly appreciated issues that are
affecting international trade flows-such as cultural and economic structural differences, questions of competition policy (antitrust), and, of course, environmental
policies.
More broadly, the GATT suffers generally from institutional deficiencies in the
two essential ingredients for an effective international organization, namely the
making of new rules, and the provisions for making those rules effective through
dispute settlement procedures.
What are the implications of all of this for environmental policy? First, as fairly
frequently noted in the text discussion in prior sections, many of the policy clashes
that environmental policy has with trade policy point towards institutional questions.
This is most importantly the case for the dispute settlement processes of GATT. It is
in those processes that some of the interstitial decisions involving interpretation of
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current or future GATT/MTO treaties will be fought out. One example of that was the
Tuna-Dolphin Case in which the panel itself noted that it would be inappropriate for
the panel to make the requested interpretation of the GATT general exceptions of
Article XX. It stated that such decisions should be made by the negotiators or the
appropriate GATT bodies as a matter of treaty law alteration, rather than simply
through an interpretation by a panel.
Nevertheless, the environmentalists, apart from the
question of precedent, have several legitimate complaints about
the GATT dispute settlement (and other) procedures. First of
all they note appropriately that the GATT lacks a certain
amount of transparency. By that, we can understand that the
GATT tends too often to try to operate in secrecy, attempting to
avoid public and news media accounts of the actions of GATT.
In recent years, this has become almost a charade, because
many of the key documents, most importantly the early results
of a GATT dispute settlement panel report, leak out almost
immediately to the press. For purposes of gaining a broader
constituency among the various policy-interested communities
in the world, gaining the trust of those constituencies and
enhancing public understanding, as well as avoiding the
charade of ineffective attempts to maintain secrecy, the GATT
could go much further in providing transparency of its processes.
Secondly, there is criticism and worry that in the dispute settlement processes
the GATT lacks the kind of expertise which would help it to make better decisions. In
particular, it is felt that expertise in environmental issues is lacking. Again, there is
considerable room for improvement in this regard, perhaps with procedures that
would give panels certain technical assistance.
Finally, there is criticism of the GATT panel processes in that they (while
operating in secret) do not make provision for the transmittal of arguments, information, and evidence from a variety of interested groups, including non-government
environmental policy groups. Once again, there should be ways that the GATT can
improve on this problem.
Apart from the dispute settlement procedures, the overall institutional set up of
a GATT and a possible MTO could be likewise improved. In particular, transparency
could be enhanced, perhaps by NGOs (Non-Governmental Organizations) as well as
IGOs (Inter-Governmental Organizations) gaining some share of participation in the
GATT processes, perhaps through an annual open meeting. Furthermore, as the
GATT or MTO continues to evolve, procedures such as those already set up called the
TPRM-Trade Policy Review Mechanism-might build in provisions for explicit
attention to environmental concerns. It is clear that some of the GATT rules need to
be changed through waivers or new negotiated text.

VII.

SOME CONCLUSIONS

In the light of those discussions, what can we say about the relationship of two
policy sets and whether they are congruent or conflicting? The answer obviously is a
bit of both.
In broader long-term perspective, there would seem to be a great deal of
congruence. Some of that congruence derives from the economic and welfare
enhancement of trade liberalization policies. Such welfare enhancement can in tum
lead to enhancement of environmental policy objectives, as mentioned at the outset of
this paper.
On the other hand, it is clear that the world trade policies and environmental
policies do provide a certain amount of conflict. This conflict is not substantially
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different from a number of other areas where governmental policies have to accommodate conflicting aims and goals of the policy makers and their constituents. Thus, to
some degree it is a question of where the line will be drawn, or how the compromises
will be made. In that sense, institutions obviously become very important, because the
decision making process can tilt the decision results. If the world trade rules are
pushed to their limit-i.e., free trade with no exceptions for problems
raised by environmental policies and actions affecting environmentsclearly the trade rules will cause damage to environmental objectives.
Likewise, if the environmental policies are pushed to their limit at the
expense of the trading rules, so that governments will find it convenient and easy to set up a variety of restrictive trade measures, in some
cases under the excuse of environmental policies, world trade will
suffer.
Furthermore, there is no doubt that the "cultures" of the two
policy communities-that of trade and that of environment-differ in
important ways. The trade policy experts have tended over decades
and perhaps centuries to operate more under the practices of international diplomacy, which often means secrecy, negotiation, compromise, and to some extent behind-the-scenes catering to a variety of
special economic interests. In addition, at the international level, the
processes are slow, faltering, and lend themselves to lowest common
denominator results, or diplomatic negotiations that agree to language
without real agreement on substance.
On the other hand, the environmental policy groups, perhaps
partly because they primarily operated on the national scene, have
become used to using the processes of publicity and lobbying pressure
on Congress or Parliament, to which they have considerable access ...
There is thus a much broader sense of "participation" in these processes, which the international processes have not yet accommodated.
Furthermore, the environmental policy groups (like many other groups
working on the domestic level) have a sense of power achieved
through successes in the legislative and public discussion processes.
They feel somewhat frustrated with the international processes because
those are sufficiently different to pose puzzling obstacles to the
achievement of environmental goals.
This difference in culture is not inevitably permanent, and indeed the international processes need to accommodate more transparency and participation. This is
true not only of the environmental case, but it is increasingly an important consideration for the broader way that international economic interdependence is managed.
As more and more decisions which affect firms, citizens, and other groups are made at
the international level, it will be necessary for the international decision-making
process to accommodate goals of transparency, adequate expertise, and participation in
the advocacy and rule-making procedures.
The notion that the United States, for example, can, or should, impose unilaterally its environmental views and standards on other parts of the world, without any
constraint from international rules or international dispute settlement procedures, is not
likely to be a viable approach in the longer run. This means that when the United
States submits (as it must, partly to get other countries to submit reciprocally) to
international dispute settlement procedures, it will sometimes lose and find itself
obliged to alter its own domestic policy preferences. This has already been the case,
and the United States has a mixed record of compliance with the GATT rulings,
although for a large powerful nation that record is not too bad.
Apart from these longer run and institutional issues, there are matters which can
be undertaken jointly by the trade and environmental policy communities, in the
context of the GATT/MTO system.

[WJhen the United States
submits ... to international
dispute settlement
procedures, it will sometimes
lose and find itselfobliged to
alter its own domestic policy
preferences.
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For the near term actions should include:
1. Greater transparency both in the rule making and in the
dispute settlement procedures of the trading system. This would
call for more participation, opportunity for policy advocacy
inputs, and more openness-e.g., publication of the relevant
documents faster and in a way more accessible to interested
parties.
2. Greater access to participation in the processes.
3. Some clarification about the degree to which the
international process will be allowed to intrude upon the .scope of
decision making of national (and subnational) governments. For
example, the "scope of review" of international GATT/MTO
panels over national government regulatory decisions concerning
environment needs to be better defined.
4. Finally, some near-term rule adjustments or changes in
those rules through one or another of the techniques for changing
GATT rules (probably focusing on the waiver procedure) to
establish a reasonably clear set of exceptions for certain multilateral environmental treaty provisions that call for trade action that
would otherwise be inconsistent with the GATT/MTO rules.
Looking at the longer term:
1. The subsidies area will need substantial study.
2. Some type of more permanent exception will be needed
either as an amendment/waiver embellishment of the Article XX
exceptions of the GATT system, or possibly in the context of the
national treatment rules. This can build upon the short-term rule
.alterations (e.g., by waiver) mentioned above, with particular
reference to the process-product characteristic question, so as to
accommodate the broadly agreed international environmental
policy provisions, such as those now contained in some treaties.
3. The GATT/MTO dispute settlement procedure will
continue to evolve, in the light of experience, and there will need
to be further adjustments in that procedure.
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